The Swiss party system has become strongly polarized over the last decade, following the rise of the Swiss People's Party and the electoral losses of center parties. This paper suggests that these developments are, at least in part, a consequence of strategic behaviour among voters. As the government policy is the result of institutionalized multiparty bargaining, voters have incentives to compensate for this watering-down by supporting parties whose positions are more extreme than their own. This paper empirically tests extent and conditions of compensatory voting in the 2007 National Council Elections using SELECTS survey data. Our results suggest that compensatory voting generally outweighs voting based on ideological proximity and increases with rising district magnitude.
Introduction
The Swiss political landscape has been marked by important developments in the last two decades. The Swiss People's Party (SVP) has made impressive electoral gains since the early 1990s. Long the junior partner of the governing coalition, it now has the largest vote share in the National Council (lower house). This status was confirmed in the 2007 elections, where the SVP could further expand its lead. At the same time, the major left-wing party, the SocialDemocrats (SPS), could hold to its vote share of the late 1980s or improve upon it, while the Greens have made important gains. One can thus observe the formation of two poles, with strongly divergent ideological positions. These party blocs have strengthened at the expense of the major centre and centre-right parties, the Christian-Democrats (CVP) and the Liberals (FDP), which have suffered significant electoral losses in recent elections.
What do these developments tell us about the motivations of the Swiss electorate? A common interpretation is that voters, too, have become more polarized. The relatively weak results of the centre parties in recent elections would be a direct reflection of the comparatively high degree of ideological polarization among Swiss citizens. Large numbers of voters should share the ideological position of the SVP and of the SPS or the Greens, respectively. Given the magnitude and speed of the changes in the party landscape, this would mean that the ideological preferences of Swiss voters have been transformed to an impressive degree over a relatively short period of time.
This paper suggests a different interpretation. The consensual character of Swiss democracy means that any party has only a limited influence over the government position. Voters, we argue, may respond to these institutional constraints by supporting parties that are more extreme than their own preferences. This 'compensatory voting' is a form of strategic voting The next section introduces compensatory voting in more detail. It also suggests that the strength of compensatory voting should be conditional on electoral district magnitude. Then, 2 we present the operationalization of our concepts and discuss the estimation of the statistical model, which combines characteristics of citizens, parties, and cantons. This is followed by the presentation and discussion of the empirical results. We find strong evidence for compensatory voting in the Swiss electorate and show that its frequency increases with district magnitude. The paper concludes by discussing some implications of our findings.
National-and district level incentives for voting strategically
Many decision theoretic models of voting conceive of voters and parties as being located on a single latent policy continuum ranging from, say, left to right (e.g., Cox 1997) . In general, voters are expected to receive the highest utility from voting for the party closest to them. In contrast, strategic voting means that citizens support a party other than the most proximal with the intention of influencing the outcome of the election (Blais et al. 2001) . Two forms of strategic voting have been identified in the literature. The best known form is when voters are influenced by the perceived electoral chances of parties. Voters may be incited not to support their preferred party because it has weak chances of winning the election (Cox 1997) . In other words, citizens should avoid 'wasting' their vote by supporting only viable parties. The incentives for such behaviour are typically stronger in majoritarian elections than in PR electoral systems (Cox 1997; Cox and Shugart 1996) . As a consequence, much of the literature on traditional strategic voting has dealt with elections hold under majoritarian rules.
'Compensatory voting' is a second form of strategic behaviour that has received some attention in the more recent literature (Grofman 1985; Adams et al. 2005 This would move the government position back toward the centre. If the SVP defends its share of votes, in contrast, it will probably keep its second seat in the government and the status quo would be confirmed. In this situation, moderate right-wing voters who prefer the status quo to a leftwards shift will be incited to vote for the SVP. This will be the case even if they are, in ideological terms, closer to the FDP than to the SVP.
1 By a similar logic, centrist voters who wish the government position to move leftwards should be incited to support a left-wing party, i.e., the Social-Democrats or the Greens.
As mentioned, compensatory voting is expected to be stronger in PR elections, which result more frequently than majoritarian elections into a coalition government. Previous research have shown strong evidence for such compensatory voting, particularly in elections where the formation of a coalition government was expected (Kedar 2005 (Kedar , 2006 . Incentives for this form of strategic voting are likely to be particularly strong in Switzerland. It is often considered one of the best examples of a consensual democracy (Lijphart 1999) , where institutions guarantee that policies are the product of a compromise among many players. The incentives for both forms of strategic voting should be linked to the district magnitude, which varies strongly in Switzerland. 2 One of the best known results of formal models of party competition under the wasted vote logic is the emergence of local two-party systems in single member districts (SMD), where both competitors converge on the median voter's position (e.g., Cox 1997) . If true, the parties that possess high leverage with regards to moving the national government's policy would be exactly those that are, due to their noncentrist ideological positions, unable to win the plurality of votes in SMDs. As the district magnitude rises, in turn, the vote shares required for winning seats declines and the electoral prospects of non-centrist parties improve. Thus, strategic voters in an SMD should be primarily worried not to waste their vote on a hopeless district party (since otherwise they would not be able to influence the national balance of power whatsoever), and vote for a party with plurality appeals. In contrast, strategic voters in larger districts do not have to worry so much about district level viability, and may vote for non-centrist parties capable of moving the national policy status quo into their preferred direction. In linking the rationales from the two literatures on strategic voting, we would therefore expect compensatory voting to increase with rising district magnitude.
Data and operationalization
Our dependent variable is a measure of voters' propensity to support a given party. Relying on such voting propensities (y), rather than voting choice, is quite frequent in the framework of spatial models. The analysis focuses on the evaluation of the choice alternatives, rather In the 2007 Swiss election study, voting propensities were measured for five to six parties, depending on the canton. Citizens were invited to indicate how likely it is that they will ever vote for each of the corresponding parties. Answers were coded on an 11-point scale, ranging from a 'very low probability' to a 'very high probability'. This variable is recoded to the 0-1 range. For the present study, the analysis is limited to the voting propensities for the governmental parties, that is, the Social-Democrats (SP), the Christian-Democrats (CVP), the Liberals (FDP) and the Swiss People's Party (SVP). The sample is defined in this way to allow us to focus on compensatory voting among the members of the governing coalition.
The spatial components of the voting choice model are based on citizens' position on the leftright scale and on their perception of parties' position on that same scale. Respondents were asked to locate both themselves and the main parties on an 11-point left-right scale. We have rescaled this item to range from 0 (left) to 1 (right), and use this information to compute both the proximity and compensatory spatial components. The proximity component is based on 6 the squared Euclidean distance between voters and parties. Accordingly, voter i's utility U from party j is defined as:
where v is the voter i's and p is the party j's position on an ideological continuum as perceived by voter i. 4 Thus, the utility of i from j so defined increases with decreasing (perceived) distance between voter and party.
Rather than relying on (perceived) party positions, the compensatory component according to Kedar (2005) incorporates the voter's perception of the corresponding party's impact on the government's left-right position:
where G i is the actual left-right position of the government, as perceived by voter i. It is defined as:
where w j is the share of government seats of party j. Moreover, we would expect the inclination to vote compensationally to increase with rising district magnitude (M), which is naturally measured as the number of seats to be allocated in a district (though we found that a log transformation of district magnitude provided the best empirical fit).The parties' electoral prospects are operationalized in two ways. First, 7 competitiveness (C) is measured using Grofman and Selb's (2009) party-specific index of political competition for d'Hondt and other parametric divisor rules. 6 In a nutshell, their index is the inverse of the minimum vote shares required for each party either to win a(nother) or to lose a seat under a worst case scenario, normalized by the threshold of exclusion (that is, the maximum vote share with which it is possible not to win a seat in a district, see Rae et al., 1971 . In a Hagenbach-Bischoff district, this is 1/(M+1)). Its maximum of 1 will obtain if a party is very close to winning a(nother) or to losing a seat; its minimum of 0 will obtain if a party is one threshold of exclusion away from winning or losing a seat. According to traditional tactical voting models based on the district level wasted vote logic, incentives to vote for a party should increase with competitiveness. However, while strategic voting should always work to the detriment of the weak competitors in single member districts, the same is not true for larger districts where additional incentives to desert seat-winning parties chanceless of winning more seats may occur. As there is less reason to expect a strong party that already won seats to be subject to strategic desertion than weak parties that did not win any seats (see Cox 1997), we also include a dummy variable, no seats (L) , that indicates whether a party won seats (0) or not (1), along with their interaction.
Empirical Model
Our dependent variable, voting propensities y, may be conceived of as being grouped within i irrespective of his or her spatial utilities, ascribe lower voting propensities to all of the parties than a satisfied voter; a party may receive lower average voting propensities than its (perceived) spatial location relative to the voters would have one expect, for example, due to unpopular leadership; and finally, the electorate of a district that is not so well integrated into the national political system may, on average, expect lower utilities from all of the national 8 parties than voters from more nationalized districts. However, these factors due not constitute a strict hierarchy. While voters are nested within districts (as no voter is enrolled in different districts), parties and voters as well as parties and districts are so-called crossed factors. To take this complex data structure into account, we set up a cross-classified model with separate error components for each of these factors (see, for example, Rasbash and Goldstein, 1994) .
where the u's are error terms pertaining to the individual, party, and district level which are assumed to be normally distributed with variances σ 1 2 , σ 2 2 and σ 3 2 , e is an observation specific error term with variance σ 0 2 , and the β's are regression weights . Note that the proximity and compensatory slopes, β 1 and β 2 , are additionally indexed with k, so that they are allowed to vary randomly across districts, as a function of log magnitude: Table 1 Figure   2 , it is obvious that the same holds true for other small districts as well. Contrary to the classical prediction of centripetal party competition in single member districts, we observe that both non-centrist parties were, on average, as competitive as the moderate parties in the single member districts. Further inspection of our data reveals that this is not owing to the possibility that non-centrist parties may field candidates closer to the median voter in small districts, and are thus perceived less extreme (see Figure 3 ). These descriptive finding basically lever out the presumed causal mechanism underlying the empirical relationship between district magnitude and extent of compensatory voting: Lower levels of compensatory voting in smaller districts just does not seem to be a consequence of non-centrist parties having worse electoral prospects in these districts as compared to larger districts! The fact that voters actually do take the parties' competitiveness into account when assigning their utilities -parties that did not win seats receive lower average voting propensities, and a party's competitiveness has a positive effect given that party has not won any seats -does not alter this puzzling conclusion.
Statistical results
explained by the two components is a function of (log) district magnitude. Therefore, the ANOVA findings reported here should be taken with a grain of salt. 
